



UN-convened Net-Zero
Asset Owner Alliance

Demonstrating 1.5°C-Aligned Decarbonisation

The fourth
progress report

October 2024

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Abbreviations and acronyms

Alliance	The UN-Convened Net-Zero Asset Owner Alliance
AuM	Assets under Management
COP	Conference of the Parties
CRREM	Carbon Risk Real Estate Monitor
CSI	Climate solutions investments
GHG	Greenhouse Gas
IPCC	Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
KPIs	Key Performance Indicators
LSEG	London Stock Exchange Group
MRV	Monitoring, Reporting, and Verification
NDCs	Nationally Determined Contributions
UNEP	United Nations Environment Programme
USD	United States Dollar



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Foreword

The Net-Zero Asset Owner Alliance Progress Report 2024 is a testament to the growing commitment and leadership of the financial sector in the journey to achieving a sustainable future. This fourth progress report is not just a document—it is a beacon of collective efforts from 88 pioneering asset owners, representing USD 9.5 trillion in assets under management, all sharing the goal of achieving net zero greenhouse gas emissions by 2050.

The significance of this report cannot be overstated. In an era where climate change has transcended theoretical discourse to become an undeniable global reality, the role of institutional investors is critical. They are uniquely positioned to drive the transition to a low-carbon economy, leveraging their influence to catalyse significant change across their investment sectors. Alliance members recognise these responsibilities and opportunities, strategically engaging in capital allocation and stakeholder engagement, while reshaping industry norms and standards to support this crucial transition.

The fourth progress report highlights the impressive strides made since the last publication in 2023. While absolute financed emissions have continued to decrease, with a notable reduction of at least six per cent annually since the Alliance was founded in 2019, challenges remain. The real economy has yet to witness reductions on a comparable scale. However, the Alliance's dedication to investing in climate solutions—evidenced by a total USD 555 billion directed towards climate solutions by 2023, or six per cent of total assets under management—demonstrates a clear commitment to bridging this gap. The fact that this over half trillion US dollar figure has grown from just USD 87 billion in 2020 demonstrates the transformational realignment of capital mobilisation towards meeting the net-zero climate objective.

Through proactive engagement and a robust target-setting protocol, the Alliance underscores the vital role of asset owners in shaping a sustainable future. Their efforts in aligning with the IPCC's no or low overshoot 1.5°C pathway requirements not only safeguard financial resilience for the institutions involved, but also inspire broader industry participation and public discourse.

We accomplish net zero emissions only if every part of society plays its commensurate role. When it comes to its role in the transition of, specifically, the global capital markets, and the global community of institutional investors, Alliance members are not only demonstrating the role of investors in the transition to the wider world, but they are truly moving the needle. This progress report serves as a detailed account of these achievements, the challenges, and the path forward. It is both a record of past successes and a strategic roadmap for continued action.

To all the leads, managers and members across the Monitoring, Reporting and Verification (MRV), Engagement, Transition Financing, Policy, and Communications working tracks, your dedication to this cause is commendable. And to outgoing Alliance Chair Günther Thallinger, your commitment to addressing one of the most pressing issues of our time has been nothing short of inspirational. We are grateful for your leadership since the Alliance was founded to present day as we achieve real progress at scale and in line with a science-based trajectory.



Eric Usher
UNEP FI Head



David Atkin
PRI CEO

Executive summary

In recent years, climate change has moved from an abstract discussion in many quarters to a present-day reality. Mounting evidence strongly suggests that global commitments to keep temperature rise to below 1.5°C by mid-century will be overshoot if urgent action is not taken. While the economic repercussions of such a scenario will play out differently in the short-term across different geographies and sectors, no corner of the global economy will be unaffected. This poses an enormous risk to all institutional investors given the integral link between their long-term financial success and that of companies in the real economy. Thus, the Net-Zero Asset Owner Alliance (“Alliance”) members strongly believe that supporting the transition to a low-carbon global economy is core to their interests.

Asset owners have a vital role to play in this collective imperative to reach net-zero greenhouse (GHG) emissions by 2050. As detailed in the Alliance’s *Target-Setting Protocol* (2024a), three main levers of influence are available to them—allocation of capital to transition-focused businesses; proactive engagement with key stakeholders (including companies, asset managers and policymakers); and contributing to changing the norms and standards in the investment ecosystem (“field building”) both by serving as a model of ambitious climate actions and by participating intentionally in public discourse.

Since the publication of the last progress report in 2023, the Alliance has been active on all three fronts, which are all embedded in the Alliance’s *Target-Setting Protocol*. Out of the four target types delineated in the protocol, three are related to capital allocation strategies: climate solutions investments; sub-portfolio; and sector targets. Engagement targets speak most closely to the stakeholder engagement lever of the theory of change, while the entirety of the Alliance’s four-pronged protocol contributes to field-building.

From the outset of the Alliance, its members have recognised the influence that comes from a show of broad financial industry support. The Alliance’s membership of 88 asset owners, with assets under management (AuM) of USD 9.5 trillion, provides just such a demonstration. Moreover, 12 additional members have set their intermediate targets since the 2023 progress report; a total of 81 members have now set targets, enlarging the AuM under the Alliance’s target-setting framework to USD 9.4 trillion (98.9 per cent of total AuM).

Members are building financial resilience by delivering demonstrable results. Even with growth in membership between 2022 and 2023, absolute financed GHG emissions decreased again in 2023 to 254 million tonnes of carbon dioxide equivalent (mtCO₂e) from 260 mtCO₂e a year earlier. **Most importantly, new data show that since the incep-**

tion of the Alliance, emissions fell by at least six per cent per year on average across all members that have set targets. These reductions are in with the 1.5°C-pathway requirements of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC).

The Alliance remains attentive to the fact that the same scale of reductions has not yet taken place in the real economy. In response, 80 target-setting members have set targets for their investments in climate solutions. Overall climate solutions investment in 2023 reached USD 555 billion and represented six per cent of the total AuM (compared to 4.6 per cent in 2022). The majority of members climate solution investments were directed to corporate bonds and real estate in 2023. Nevertheless, investments in private assets marked a notable increase, more than doubling to USD 33 billion since 2022.

When it comes to sub-portfolio targets, the average targeted reduction set was 26 per cent across all asset classes, which falls within the decarbonisation ranges set out by the protocol and based on the IPCC's no- or limited-overshoot 1.5°C scenarios in the Sixth Assessment Report (2022). Nearly half (48 per cent) of the Alliance's total AuM is now covered by these targets (compared to 42 per cent in 2022), showing the growing robustness of the *Target-Setting Protocol*. Coverage is expected to increase further once all asset classes covered under the fourth edition of the protocol are fully phased in. Moreover, challenges with data-acquisition remain in certain asset classes, such as private assets. To help resolve this bottleneck, Alliance members continue to advocate for improved disclosure, both directly to private corporates and through asset managers operating in private markets.

The Alliance supports this advocacy as a way for members to proactively communicate their long-term interests and concerns to decision-makers in companies, issuer firms, regulatory bodies and policy-making circles. Thus, the Alliance's portfolio contains mandatory engagement targets. Members have set individual engagement targets, which total of 242 engagements by 2025. Of these, over half (55 per cent) have already been met completely and more than one quarter (26 per cent) are over halfway towards completion.

Despite important advances in members' portfolio decarbonisation over the last twelve months, the Alliance concedes that progress in transitioning to net zero in the real economy is not happening fast enough. For long-term investors, the divergence of governments' climate commitments and existing policies is untenable. The course must change to deliver a net-zero transition in the real economy. Therefore the Alliance published a detailed white paper in 2024 arguing for governments to utilise carbon pricing as a way to meet their Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) and why it remains active on policy engagement through its Policy Track.

With the asset owners demonstrating that setting ambitious climate targets, delivering on them, and reducing absolute financed emissions is possible, the focus must now turn to governments and financial regulators so that asset owners and the rest of the investment ecosystem can continue supporting the net-zero transition effectively.



1. Introduction

By now it is clear that climate change will affect all economic actors across all geographies in some way. However, the systemic risk that climate change poses is distributed differently across the global economy. Because of the nature of their businesses, institutional investors are focused on long-term financial returns. As such, they are tied to the long-term health of the economy and thus ‘hold’ the risk of economic uncertainty. That is why addressing climate change risk and seizing the opportunity to invest in a net-zero transition represents a fundamental business question for asset owners.

Responsibility and opportunity for institutional investors to contribute to the net-zero transition

Addressing this risk, however, is a challenging task for any one asset owner. The Net-Zero Asset Owner Alliance (Alliance) was launched with the goal of convening institutional investors that are committed to fully decarbonising their portfolios by 2050. Convened in this way, they are better able to contribute to important conversations regarding the transition, develop decarbonisation methodologies, and exercise a strong unified voice when approaching policymakers and other external stakeholders. Joining a voluntary initiative of this kind therefore enables asset owners to both decarbonise their own businesses more efficiently and to influence incentive shifts in the real economy more effectively. The approach is rooted in the Alliance’s theory of change, which recognises asset owners as proactive agents of change that can contribute to a net-zero transition through three main levers—namely, capital allocation strategies, engagement approaches, and field building. A summary of the three levers and how they are integrated into the Alliance’s Commitment and other core documents is included here, while a longer discussion may be found in the *Background Document* of the fourth edition of the Alliance’s *Target-Setting Protocol* (2024a).

From a perspective of an individual asset owner, the focus of **capital allocation strategies** for mitigating climate risk is twofold: laying out plans to invest in ambitious companies, states, and/or climate solution projects; and slowly withdrawing capital from individual companies that are not acting effectively to decarbonise. The Alliance has worked capital allocation into its framework by including sub-portfolio and sector targets as part of its *Target-Setting Protocol*—a core document defining how members are to set science-based decarbonisation targets in alignment with the 1.5°C goal of the Paris Agreement.

Engagement is one of the most direct mechanisms by which investors can represent their interests and concerns to companies, issuers, policymakers or regulators, and, more broadly, the business community. The Alliance’s engagement mission is for members’ investee companies and asset managers to understand and represent its

members' long-term interests of achieving an orderly transition to a net-zero economy. Depending on their individual business context and organisational expertise, each Alliance member individually decides which forms of engagement are best suited to their respective organisation. With this in mind, the Alliance covers engagement in its protocol by setting key performance indicators (KPIs) for different types of engagement, including those with corporations, asset managers, key sector organisations, and policymakers.

The sum of the Alliance's activities contributes to **field building**. The concept of field building refers to efforts to change the norms and standards—which are precursors to ambitious climate policies and regulation—in the investor ecosystem. When it comes to the Alliance's contribution, of particular importance are the publication of the *Target-Setting Protocol* and the Alliance's yearly reporting through its *Progress Report*. Both of these documents are readily accessible to the investor community and the wider public. In its theory of change, the Alliance clearly identifies that asset owners have the capacity to influence these fields (*Alliance's Target-Setting Protocol*, 2024, p. 2–8). This brings with it a concomitant responsibility to do so. Among members' primary modes of influence are: changing the discourse; delegitimising certain business activities; establishing voluntary standards; and either supporting or calling for regulatory and policy changes that may lead to mandatory standards. The Alliance's very framework provides a clear model of action that policymakers can build upon. In the first instance, the framework places an expectation on members to set science-based intermediate climate targets within 12 months of joining. These must align with the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change's (IPCC) no-overshoot or low-overshoot 1.5°C pathways. Secondly, it requires members to annually report on their progress in meeting the targets.

While the Alliance's requirements and support for members yield significant progress—as this report will show—voluntary action does have its limits when it comes to real economy change. Likewise, an important degree of responsibility for progress sits with other stakeholders in the investor ecosystem. The following section discusses these considerations in greater detail.

What remains beyond investors' purview?

As elaborated in the Alliance's *Target-Setting Protocol* (2024, p. 11–12), the gap between the emissions trajectories of net-zero-aligned asset owners and the real economy is currently widening. The United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) reported that according to the last pledged Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) under the Paris Agreement, the world would still be headed towards a warming of 2.1–2.4°C (2023). This is considerably away from the 1.5°C pathways necessary to avoid the most destructive impacts of climate change.



Figure 1: Summary of the Alliance’s four-part target-setting approach

The London Stock Exchange Group (LSEG)’s *Decarbonisation in equity benchmarks* (2024) report confirms the trend of ever-growing emissions in the real economy. Tracking the absolute emissions trends in global equities (FTSE-All World index), LSEG observed that the aggregate emissions and chained emissions¹ have increased by more than 3.8 per cent and 2.3 per cent, respectively, since the Paris Agreement entered into force in 2016. Its calculations account for short-term volatility, such as the COVID-19 pandemic, and for changes in the index’s constituents. However, LSEG observed an encouraging decoupling of economic growth from emissions, with the carbon intensity of the same FTSE-All World index dropping in the 2016–2022 period. However, the systemic incentive shift required to convince corporates that decarbonisation is inevitable has yet to fully take shape.

¹ Chained emissions are calculated as the change in absolute emissions each year for persistent constituents only—i.e., firms that were also in the index prior to a given year.

Such a profound incentive shift requires changes in policy and regulation. It is for this reason that members of the Alliance made their net-zero commitments “with the expectation that governments will follow through on their own commitments to ensure the objects of the Paris Agreement are met” (NZAOA, 2022a, p. 2). Without a substantial shift in policy and without the change in the emissions trajectories of the real economy, Alliance members and net-zero-aligned asset owners alike will face a shrinking investable universe. Considering the important influence that external stakeholders have on members’ ability to meet their net-zero commitments, the Alliance’s report is organised into two themes: first, actions undertaken by asset owners to decarbonise their portfolios; and second, actions required of other key stakeholders in the investor ecosystem.

Chapters 2 and 3 quantify the Alliance’s progress to date as it relates to the setting of intermediate targets and the level of their subsequent achievement. Specifically, Chapter 2 discusses membership growth, assets under management (AuM) covered by intermediate targets, absolute financed emissions, and investments in climate solutions. Chapter 3 dives further into specific target types and covers the Alliance’s progress at the sub-portfolio, sector, and engagement levels. The sector section also covers members’ implementation of the Alliance’s sectoral positions. Having listed the Alliance’s actions, Chapter 4 then reflects on specific policy developments that have contributed to a net-zero transition. Finally, it points out remaining challenges and addresses priority asks to key stakeholders ahead of COP29 and beyond.

2. Walking the talk—aggregate data on progress of Alliance members

2.1 Who are the target setters?

Continuing the Alliance’s trend of steady growth, three members have joined the Alliance since the last progress report.² This brings the total number of asset owners to 88 (as of August 2024), resulting in a slight increase of combined AuM to USD 9.5 trillion since last year (Figure 2).³ The Alliance’s composition remained mostly the same, with 62 per cent of members being insurance companies, 28 per cent pensions funds, five per cent sovereign wealth or government-controlled funds, and five per cent being endowments, philanthropies, and family offices.

Absolute number of members




Figure 2: Growth in the Alliance’s membership and total AuM

2 One member, PKA, withdrew from the Alliance on 30 August 2024. For full details of members, see: unepfi.org/net-zero-alliance/alliance-members/

3 One incorrect AuM figure was mistakenly reported last year, leading to an initial AuM of USD 9.5 trillion in the 2023 progress report. After correcting this error for December 2023, the adjusted figure was USD 9.4 trillion. With the addition of new members, the total AuM has now risen to USD 9.5 trillion.

As the Alliance’s membership continues to grow, there has been a corresponding increase in the number of members setting their intermediate targets. As seen in Figure 3, 81 asset owners with an AuM of USD 9.4 trillion have now adopted the Alliance’s target-setting methodology, as outlined in the Alliance’s *Target-Setting Protocol*. Twelve more members (i.e. an additional 13 per cent) successfully published and reported their intermediate targets. Four members did not fulfil the requirement to report their targets and progress and have been flagged by the Alliance’s Accountability Mechanism.⁴ The full list of members with public links to their individual targets can be found in table A.1 in the annex of the report.




Figure 3: The number and total AuM of members that set intermediate targets by the end of the 2024 Alliance reporting cycle

The Alliance’s protocol outlines a four-part target-setting methodology (as seen in Figure 1), which includes one mandatory target type—engagement targets. Members are required to set targets in at least two of the three additional categories: sub-portfolio, sector, and climate solution investments. Figure 4 shows the total number of members setting targets across each target type. In addition, the figure groups ‘target-setters’ into cohorts from 2021 to 2024, which reflect the first year that a member sets their intermediate targets. Analysing the 2024 cohort, it is evident that the 12 new target-setting members have all chosen to set targets for both their sub-portfolio and climate solution investments.

⁴ See more on the Alliance’s Accountability Mechanism here: unepfi.org/net-zero-alliance/about/alliance-accountability-mechanism/ (accessed on 19 September).




Figure 4: Total number of members' intermediate targets set across the Alliance's four target types

2.2 Showing consistent reductions in absolute financed emissions

The Alliance's Commitment (2022a) lays out its requirement for members to publicly disclose and report their absolute financed greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, in addition to publishing their intermediate climate targets. This is intended to demonstrate transparency and accountability throughout members' respective journeys towards decarbonisation.

In 2023, the Alliance began to secure data on member's absolute financed GHG emissions. The columns on the 'x' axis in Figure 5 show the aggregated financed emissions between December 2018 and December 2023 of all members that have reported their emissions data for those asset classes on which they have set targets. In addition, the aggregated numbers are broken down into cohorts of members (shown in different colours), organised according to the year in which members started reporting these data. The light blue, for example, groups all members that defined their base year in 2019 and reported their emissions thereafter. The figure also shows the specific diminishment in emissions for each of the cohorts throughout the years.




Figure 5: Absolute financed GHG emissions (excluding sovereign debt) of the Alliance members with intermediate targets for the December 2018–2023 period⁵

Given the Alliance’s consistent membership growth since 2019 (shown as the black dotted line), the total of the Alliance’s absolute financed GHG emissions correspondingly increased to 278 million tons of carbon dioxide equivalent (tCO₂e) by 2021. However, despite further growth in membership in both 2022 and 2023, Figure 5 shows that absolute financed GHG emissions decreased, first, to a total of 260 million tCO₂e by 2022 and then to 254 million tCO₂e in 2023 (Figure 6).⁶

To dive deeper into analysing the financed GHG emissions of each cohort, Figure 6 shows the reductions in percentage. A marked downward trend is present for each cohort.

The critical detail here is that all cohorts recorded reductions of at least six per cent annually. This rate of reduction is in line with the 1.5°C-aligned pathway requirements. In other words, the Alliance’s 81 members that have already set their intermediate climate targets have on average achieved incremental portfolio decarbonisation that, if replicated in the real economy, would likely lead to limiting global warming to 1.5°C.⁷ The Alliance sees this as a testament to the bold actions of its members. The Alliance’s work in attributing emissions has shown that these reductions are often largely a result of portfolio reallocations, shifting capital to more sustainable investments. Members have assessed real economy reductions, and these fall short of what science needs. Actions that would create change in the real economy are discussed in detail in Chapter 4.

5 One of the members reported financed emissions with a one-year lag. To provide a coherent reporting in Figures 5 and 6, the member’s data for 2022 is taken as their data for 2023.

6 The data coverage for financed emissions currently hovers at around 70 per cent of members’ AuM and it shows an increasing trend every year.

7 The IPCC uses “likely chance” to describe a likelihood greater than 66 per-cent chance.

Cohort (all members with the same reporting base year)




Figure 6: Members’ annual reduction of financed GHG emissions as of 12/2023, normalised by each cohort

It is important to note that factors beyond membership size and portfolio decarbonisation can also affect data on absolute financed GHG emissions. The Alliance’s 2023 report on Understanding the Drivers of Investment Portfolio Decarbonisation (NZAOA, 2023a) lays out the case for individual asset owners to conduct attribution analysis, so as to identify the main drivers of emission reductions. As that level of analysis remains beyond the scope of this report, it is important to reiterate that the following factors may indeed influence variation from one year to another:

- Upward or downward variation of real-world GHG emissions,
- Improvement of GHG emission disclosures by investee companies,
- Upward or downward variation of absolute AuM of each asset owner,
- Percentage of AuM allocated to asset classes already covered by a GHG emissions measurement methodology (e.g. corporate bonds, listed equities, real estate, etc.),
- The capacity and choice of each asset owner to report Scope 3 emissions on top of Scope 1 and 2 emissions,
- The time lag between GHG emissions reporting by investee companies and GHG emissions accounting by asset owners, and
- Other factors such as the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic.

2.3 Climate solution investments

The protocol foresees that all members of the Alliance are required to report the total amount of their climate solution investments annually, while many have set optional targets for growth in this category. According to the Alliance’s theory of change, these investments should demonstrate an upwards trend over the years. Those members that set a climate solutions investments target have the option to define their target in quantitative terms. Of the Alliance’s 81 members that have set their intermediate target by the 2024 reporting cycle, as many as 80 have set climate solutions investments targets.

Since the inception of the Alliance, the number of members who have voluntarily set an individual climate solutions investments target has grown year by year and so has the total AuM they have invested in climate solutions (see Figure 7). Alliance members were able to progress steadily with the implementation of their investment targets for climate solutions and reach USD 555 billion in 2023 (from USD 380 billion in 2022). This jump in climate solutions investments (CSI) is mirrored in the metric that looks at the share of climate solutions investment in members’ total AuM. Figure 7 shows a 1.4 per-cent point increase in the share of climate solutions between 2022 and 2023.

	USD billion	No. of members with CSI targets	Members' total AuM (USD bn)	Share of CSI
Dec 2020	87	17	2,120	4.1%
Dec 2021	253	15	6,155	4.1%
Dec 2022	380	68	8,262	4.6%
Dec 2023	555	81	9,227	6.0%

Figure 7: Growth in the Alliance members’ climate solutions investments since 2020

Similar to last year, the latest set of self-reported data reveals a significant range among members when it comes to the share of climate solutions investments as a percentage of their respective total AuM invested in climate solutions. At first glance, the Alliance’s averaged ratio of investments in climate solutions to total AuM may not seem high, but it should be noted that investors are applying stringent requirements on what qualifies. This should also be contextualised within the Alliance’s protocol, which presupposes that universal owners’ investments in climate solutions investments is only one lever towards a net-zero transition. Other decarbonisation levers to consider include members’ sectoral, engagement, and portfolio decarbonisation targets.

The overall investment of USD 555 billion in climate solutions by members of the Alliance is distributed across different asset classes. The majority is directed towards corporate bonds and real estate, followed by listed equity and then infrastructure (see Figure 8).




Figure 8: Spread of members’ climate solutions investments across asset classes⁸

Compared to the previous reporting year, the biggest spike in reported climate solutions investments was in listed equity and corporate bonds. In private markets, where innovation funding for developing climate solutions often takes place, data are scarcely available, harder to gather, and more difficult to systematically report for institutional investors. In this context, it is particularly positive to note that the Alliance’s climate solutions investments reached USD 33 billion in private assets by the end of 2023 (Figure 8). This represents an increase of more than 200 per cent over the last 12 months. Furthermore, in 2024, the Alliance started a strategic collaboration with the non-profit organisation CREO in order to build out expertise and a platform on climate solutions investments.⁹ The move grew out of a recognition of the challenges that institutional investors face when investing in climate solutions in private assets.

8 The Alliance’s 2023 progress report displayed climate solution investments that could not be split by asset class under “other”. This was updated in this year’s reporting.

9 For more details on CREO, see: creosyndicate.org/

When interpreting Figure 9 to determine which sectors the Alliance’s climate solutions investments are taking place in, it is important to keep in mind that not all Alliance members reported sectoral splits of their climate solutions investments. However, those who did provide disaggregated data are shown to have allocated their investments primarily in the buildings and energy sectors, which comprise 34 per cent and 29 per cent of total investment, respectively. This sector split is mainly consistent with last year’s split, albeit with a slight shift: while investment into the buildings and energy sector decreased, investments in other sectors like Information and communications technology (ICT)¹⁰ increased from four per cent in 2022 to 13 per cent in 2023 and transportation from six to ten per cent in the same period (NZAOA 2023b).




Figure 9: Percentage distribution of 2024 climate solution investments per sector¹¹

10 The Information and communications technology sector, as defined by OECD, “combines manufacturing and services industries whose products primarily fulfil or enable the function of information processing and communication by electronic means, including transmission and display.”

11 Please note: This chart shows climate solutions investments, self-reported by Alliance members, who voluntarily classified their climate solutions investments into sectors for reporting purposes. The sector attribution is thus based on fraction of the USD 555.5 billion figure (44.5 per cent), which amounts to USD 247.3 billion.

3. Diving into the data further

3.1 Sub-portfolio decarbonisation

Out of the 81 members that set intermediate targets, 79 have established sub-portfolio targets. Together, these members comprise a combined AuM of USD 8.9 trillion, designated as “total AuM of members with sub-portfolio targets” in Figure 10 below. Out of the USD 8.9 trillion covered by the Alliance’s Commitment, 48 per cent—equivalent to USD 4.3 trillion—is now covered by sub-portfolio targets. This reflects an increase both in absolute terms and in relative terms compared to the previous year when 42 per cent of the combined AuM was covered by sub-portfolio targets.

The remaining AuM that is not covered by sub-portfolio target reflects asset classes that are not in scope of the protocol, such as sovereign debt. In addition, the remaining AuM also accounts for private assets, which have not been phased in yet. While the latest *Target-Setting Protocol* is the most comprehensive to date, and among the most comprehensive of all voluntary initiative frameworks, private assets are still going through the data-acquisition phase. As private assets advance through this initial process over the coming years, the total sub-portfolio target coverage is expected to increase.



Figure 10: AuM covered by sub-portfolio targets and the total AuM of members setting such targets

Since the introduction of the Inaugural Target-Setting Protocol, the asset classes of listed equity, corporate debt, and directly-held real estate have shown strong AuM coverage. All three continue to maintain high levels of coverage, with Listed Equity, for example, at 95 per cent of the pledged AuM also covered by a sub-portfolio target (Table 1).

This is consistent with last year's figures. Meanwhile, there was a modest increase in coverage for real estate, which rose from 78 to 81 per cent. Corporate debt also inched up, increasing by one percentage point to 94 per cent. Targets on carbon-intensive infrastructure loans were phased-in last year and show already now a good target coverage of 87 per cent.

Table 1: Portion of members' AuM covered by their sub-portfolio targets disaggregated by asset class

	AuM of members with a sub-portfolio target (USD billion)	AuM covered by sub-portfolio targets (USD billion)	Percentage of AuM coverage
Publicly traded corporate debt	2,095.9	1,963.7	94%
Listed equity	1,318.8	1,250.1	95%
Directly-held real estate	431.5	349.8	81%
Infrastructure loans (carbon intensive energy assets)	5.9	5.1	87%

Sub-portfolio targets comprise a crucial part of tracking overall emissions reductions. Overall, across asset classes the average targeted reduction was 28.2 per cent,¹² with a minimum average of 12 per cent and a maximum of 45 per cent across asset classes. Of single corporate debt targets, 15 per cent or 11 members set absolute targets, while the remainder were set on an intensity basis (for details on these numbers please see the Annex). For listed equity, the number is slightly higher, at 18 per cent or 13 members (see Figure 11).



Figure 11: Ambition of sub-portfolio targets set for listed equity¹³

¹² This figure excludes Real estate as minimums are often much lower than global average requirements due to the fact that Real Estate requires relatively smaller reductions to reach national pathways (such as those provided by the benchmark Carbon Risk Real Estate Monitor (CRREM)).

¹³ All base years have been normalised to 2019 for aggregation purposes. Where asset owners did not set a target on listed equity, they either do not have exposure to this asset class or were flagged under the Alliance Accountability Mechanism to provide an explanation (see footnote 4 for more information on the mechanism). This approach was also adopted for figures A.3–A.5.

3.2 Working on sector-level changes

Sector targets contribute to the achievement of total portfolio decarbonisation while driving appropriate sector-level alignment with the transition. The Alliance’s *Target-Setting Protocol (2024a)* provides detailed guidance on using sector pathways to set targets on those sectors that are material for a member’s portfolio. In particular, it recommends physical intensity targets over economic intensity targets to best represent reductions in real-world emissions. Aligned with these recommendations, the vast majority of members setting sector targets have duly used physical intensity metrics.

Setting sector targets can present challenges for members. As a result, the number of institutions setting sector targets has not significantly changed since the *2023 Progress Report (Alliance, 2023b)*. In 2024, eight members with targets on the oil and gas sector targeted reductions of 28.7 per cent (Figure 12), with a high of 43.2 per cent. Going forward, increased disclosure from real-economy companies is expected to drive higher sector target-setting. Specifically, as more pertinent information becomes available from the companies operating within the sectors with the highest decarbonisation pathway challenges, the number of Alliance members setting sector targets is bound to increase.

An additional obstacle that exists at this stage is the reliance of many Alliance members on external asset manager, which do not yet offer many products that reflect sector decarbonisation pathways. From the Alliance’s perspective, there is a clear need for asset managers to offer a new product range to cover this lacuna.

Main metrics used to set sector targets	
Oil and Gas	Operational carbon intensity (Scope 1 & 2); mio. tCO ₂ e/PJ
Utilities	tCO ₂ e/MWh
Cement and Steel	tCO ₂ /tonne of cement; tCO ₂ /tonne of steel
Shipping	gCO ₂ /tkm
Light and heavy duty road	gCO ₂ /pkm
Aviation	gCO ₂ /pkm or gCO ₂ /RTK




Figure 12: Targets on emission-intensity reductions by sector¹⁴

The Alliance has published four position papers on topics that are crucial to achieving a net-zero transition, including two that require members to develop individual policies or positions in alignment with the Alliance’s or explain their inability to do so. Members first reported on their adoption and implementation of the Alliance’s *Thermal Coal Position* during the 2023 reporting cycle. In the current reporting cycle, members have reported for the first time on their adoption and implementation of the Alliance’s *Position on the Oil and Gas Sector*.

A total of 81 members were required to report on their thermal coal policies in the 2024 reporting cycle. Figure 13 indicates that seven members reported having no exposure to thermal coal, while 74 members have such exposure. All 74 members with exposure have implemented a thermal coal policy.




Figure 13: Data on members’ exposure to and positions on thermal coal

Each Alliance position paper outlines key elements that members are required to either adopt and implement or explain any deviation. Table 2 presents the self-assessment of alignment with these key elements by the 74 members who have exposure to thermal coal and a policy in place. It shows that 80 per cent of these members consider them-

¹⁴ All base years have been normalised to 2019 for aggregation purposes.

selves fully aligned with the key element requiring the immediate cancellation of all new thermal coal projects, while 20 per cent acknowledge that their position differs from these elements, by either being more or less ambitious. Members whose positions differ from the Alliance’s are required to provide an explanation, which is reviewed by the Peer Review Group in accordance with the Alliance Accountability Mechanism.

Table 2: Members’ self-assessed alignment with each of the key elements of the Alliance Thermal Coal Position



For the *Position on the Oil and Gas Sector*, the same 81 target-setting members were required to adopt a position in line with the Alliance’s or justify their inability to do so. Of these, four members reported having no exposure to the oil and gas Sector. There were 65 members that reported having exposure to either oil or gas, or both, and having a policy in place (see Figure 14). However, 12 members indicated they have exposure to the sector but do not have an official policy in place. Among this latter group, two members did not respond to any of the key elements outlined in Tables 3 and 4, while ten provided responses.



Figure 14: Data on members’ exposure to and positions on oil and gas

The Alliance’s *Position on the Oil and Gas Sector (2023c)* includes one key element on engagement (Table 3) and three key elements related to direct infrastructure investments in oil and gas (Table 4). A total of 74 members reported on their engagement policies or statement. Among them, 59 per cent consider themselves fully aligned with the key engagement element, while 11 per cent indicated a difference in alignment. Additionally, 30 per cent of members do not have an official policy on engagement but consider themselves aligned in practice, with each providing an explanation to this effect. Assessments that differ were reviewed by the Peer Review Group.

Table 3: Members' self-assessed alignment with the engagement element of the Alliance Position on the Oil and Gas Sector

Are you aligned with the key element of the position?	Yes			No			No official position but consider themselves aligned in practice		
	Key elements of the Alliance's Position on the Oil and Gas Sector								
Policy on engagement ¹⁵	59%			11%			30%		

Table 4 outlines the key elements related to direct infrastructure investments in oil and gas, addressing upstream, midstream, and downstream separately. Of the 75 members who reported, between 36 and 41 per cent indicated they have no exposure to the specific elements of the position. An additional 37 to 46 per cent declared being fully aligned with a specific key element. Finally, 16 to 27 per cent reported differences between their institution's position on oil and gas and the position of the Alliance. As noted earlier, members who report differences are required to provide an explanation, which is reviewed by the Peer Review Group.¹⁶

Table 4: Members' self-assessed alignment with the key elements of the Position on the Oil and Gas Sector

Key elements of the Position on the Oil and Gas Sector	Are you aligned with the key element of the position?		
	Yes	No	No exposure
Upstream oil: No new oil fields should be financed, built, developed, or planned. Investment should be limited to existing oil fields.	45%	16%	39%
Midstream oil: Investment in oil pipeline distribution and storage should be limited to brownfield projects.	46%	17%	37%
Downstream oil: No investment should be made in oil-fired power generation infrastructure. Investment in refineries and petrochemicals should be limited to brownfield projects (e.g., to promote efficiency or eliminate fugitive methane emissions)	42%	17%	41%
Upstream gas: No new gas fields should be financed, built, developed, or planned. Investment should be limited to existing oil fields.	44%	17%	39%
Midstream gas: investment in gas pipeline transmission, distribution and storage should be limited to brownfield projects. Investments in the conversion of gas pipelines to transport hydrogen are acceptable. No investment in new midstream infrastructure for gas, unless aligned with 1.5°C low/no overshoot pathways.	40%	23%	37%
Downstream gas: No investment should be made in unabated new baseload gas-fired power generation or in infrastructure using gas as a fuel to produce hydrogen in the absence of carbon capture, utilisation and storage (CCUS). No new gas infrastructure unless it is designed with carbon reduction measures sufficient to align with 1.5°C low/no overshoot pathways.	37%	23%	40%

15 Example policy could be: "Our company engages O&G investee companies and asset managers to engage with O&G by applying the actions in the NZAOA position (Section 2.3.3), in line with the described expectations (Section 2.1)."

16 For more information, see footnote 3.

While target setting, position alignment, and transparent reporting comprise critical elements of the Alliance’s commitment to credibility, it is important to note that these activities only demonstrate a fraction of the efforts undertaken by members. Numerous additional efforts are also undertaken by members to enable a supportive environment for the net-zero transition. Examples include engagement with policymakers around the world, aligning asset manager mandates with net-zero objectives, and engaging corporate leaders in the boardroom.

3.3 Engaging with key stakeholders

The Alliance target setting demonstrates a continued increase in committed effort to leveraging multiple streams of engagement as members find appropriate. A note of significance is the rise in the total number of targets related to the relationship between asset owners and asset managers (Figure 16).




Figure 15: Number of member targets set on different engagement KPIs (May 2021–24)¹⁷

17 Two KPIs that were added in 2023 are not presented in this chart.

Targets for asset manager engagement do not only include the delegation of corporate engagement, but also the direct engagement of asset managers to represent their clients' climate interests. This has been particularly welcomed as the focus of the Engagement Track for the past two years has been to support members by developing guidance to deliver on more effective engagement of asset managers. The Alliance has also released a direct call to action to the asset management industry in February this year, entitled *Serving Asset Owner Clients through Climate Stewardship*.

The number of engagement targets falling into each of the ten KPIs are listed within the four categories of engagements, as described in the third version of the Alliance's *Target-Setting Protocol (2023d)*.¹⁸ Table 5 shows the number of KPIs that have been fully achieved to date. The Alliance expects to see strong progress towards full achievement of the 2025 goals in the run-up to this target date. Likewise, an increase in the number of targets set for 2030 is anticipated.

Table 5: Level of achievement of engagement targets (in absolute and percentage terms)

Target year	Number of engagement targets set	Targets already fully achieved (100% progress and more)	75% to 99% progress	50% to 74.9% progress	Less than 50% progress
2025	242	55%	10%	16%	18%
2030	41	34%	7%	20%	39%

¹⁸ In the previous versions of the Target-Setting Protocol, there were eight engagement KPIs. This is why figure 15, which provides a longitudinal look at members' engagement targets from 2021 to 2024 covers eight KPIs (rather than ten, which were introduced in the third version of the protocol).

4. New policy developments, best practices, and remaining challenges

4.1 Encouraging climate policy developments

Along with its progress on portfolio-level decarbonisation, the Alliance has also seen many encouraging policy developments since its launch—both climate policies (at the intergovernmental level and at the level of individual jurisdictions) and regulatory policy for finance and corporates. A substantial number of these gained steam or fully materialised in 2023. The rest of this section provides an overview of some of these encouraging policies, including subsidies and incentives supporting a net-zero transition, carbon pricing instruments, mandatory disclosures, and the deepening of intergovernmental agreements.

More and more jurisdictions are introducing tax measures and market incentives to drive a low-carbon transition. The number of subsidy schemes and tax incentives for climate solutions—including renewable energy and electric vehicles—increased to 108 in 2024, a rise of 21 per cent on 2023 (KPMG 2023, 2024). Apart from positive incentives, there has also been an expansion of mechanisms to price externalities of polluting behaviour, such as the prices on carbon and plastics. In its *Updated Position on Governmental Carbon Pricing* (2024c), the Alliance acknowledges that the number of jurisdictions with carbon pricing instruments is growing significantly. However, the emissions coverage of such instruments is rising slowly, increasing just one per cent between 2022 and 2023 (from 22 to 23 per cent). As such, the Alliance called on policymakers to expand the use of carbon prices as one of the most cost-effective decarbonisation measures to fulfil their NDCs under the Paris Agreement.

The incentives that make it more attractive for investors to allocate capital to climate solution projects, corporates, and sovereigns are strengthening the economic case for investing in the net-zero transition. With investment needs for keeping global warming below 1.5°C amounting to USD 136–275 trillion by 2050, opportunities for investors are abundant. At least USD 20–31 trillion of this figure is directly relevant to asset owners (Alliance 2023e). Alongside such opportunities, an undeniable market momentum can now be seen. Adoption of renewables, electric car sales, and deployment of heat pumps have all registered record growth since 2021. The UNEP *Emissions Gap Report* (2023) provides a very useful overview of the sectors across key net-zero KPIs.

The proliferation of mandatory non-financial disclosure frameworks is another encouraging development. These frameworks contribute to market efficiencies by allowing market actors to assess their own (and their business partners') climate risk. A notable development here is the European Union's Directive on Corporate Sustainability Due Diligence (CSDDD). This legislation entered into force in July 2024 and sets a duty for companies to identify and address the impact of their own operations on human rights and the environment. The directive also expects the companies to carry out the same assessment for their subsidiaries and, where relevant, to their value chain(s). In addition, the directive places an obligation on corporates to develop and implement transition plans aligned with the 2050 climate neutrality objective of the Paris Agreement (European Commission n.d.). The Alliance supports this standardisation and efforts to create a uniform legal framework. The Alliance's reporting mechanism and peer exchanges in working groups already provide members with an excellent basis to fulfil their CSDDD obligations. The Alliance's activities in its Policy Track will continue to voice members' support for more comprehensive and transparent climate data. This, in turn, will help support adoption of mandatory disclosure frameworks in other jurisdictions.

Combining multiple policy instruments to deliver on a country's climate goals is both desirable and necessary. The Inflation Reduction Act, passed in the United States of America in 2022, provides an example of a policy package that sends a strong signal to corporates and investors of the future trajectory of climate policy. The act was approved with a total budget of USD 416 billion, described at the time "the largest climate investment in US". Its explicit intention was to catalyse additional private sector investments (RMI 2023). The move has already sparked investments in energy transition technologies worth USD 303 billion, indicating that "the effects of the Inflation Reduction Act are starting to be felt" (BloombergNEF 2024). These effects will also be felt across complex supply chains, having a reverberating impact well beyond the implementing jurisdiction.

At the intergovernmental level, the UAE Consensus (agreed at the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change's COP28 in Dubai) has resulted in vast amounts of new climate commitments. These include the Global Renewables and Energy Efficiency Pledge (endorsed by 132 member states) and the Multilateral Development Banks' announcement regarding an additional USD 180 billion in climate finance that will be delivered through multi-year programmes. Central banks and financial regulators have, on the whole, also stepped up when it comes to incorporating climate risk into financial stability assessments and monetary policy.

However, some of the key issues relevant to investors remain outstanding. Notable here is the failure so far to finalise the framework for Article 6 of the Paris Agreement (on carbon markets). The role of private capital in the New Collective Quantified Goal (NCQG) that is slated for adoption at COP29 in late 2024 is yet to be clarified, and member states' own NDCs still far short of the Paris Agreement goal. The following section discusses these challenges and other key policy gaps that persist. To overcome those challenges, the Alliance also formulates its asks for key stakeholders, for COP29 and beyond.

4.2 Challenges, potential solutions, and key stakeholders

While the policy developments mentioned in the previous chapter are encouraging, it is important to put them into perspective of the action needed to achieve the Paris Agreement goal of limiting global warming to below 1.5°C. According to the United Nations Environment Programme's (UNEP) *Emissions Gap Report (2023)*, if current policies are continued, global warming is estimated to shoot past 2°C and be limited to 3°C. Even when looking at full implementation of the current NDCs, which have seen a “negligible” advancement since COP 27, there remains a “high” emissions gap with the 1.5°C goal. More precisely, the emissions gap in 2030 between unconditional NDCs and 1.5°C pathways stands at about 22 gigatons of carbon dioxide equivalent (range: 21–24). In light of these projections, UNEP is calling for “immediate, accelerated and relentless mitigation action” to get in line with the 1.5°C pathways. To do so will require a reduction in GHG emissions of 42 per cent by 2030.

Alliance members recognise the urgency of this reduction imperative as reflected in its recent call to action (2024). The Alliance calls on policymakers and regulators to urgently enact the following measures to manage down systemic risk and unlock capital for a just transition to net zero:

1. Undertake systemic interventions that can deliver demand reductions for oil and gas and increase low- and zero-emissions energy supply through economy-wide action. Inefficient fossil fuels subsidies must be phased out, while giving adequate consideration to workers and communities affected by the transition. (NZAOA 2023a)
2. Design and implement appropriate and equitable carbon pricing mechanisms, aligned with their Paris Agreement commitments. (NZAOA 2024c)
3. Implement clear policy frameworks, strong government commitments, ambitious targets, and regulatory requirements for detailed and credible transition plans that can help overcome barriers to net-zero investment. (NZAOA 2023b)
4. Phase-out all unabated existing coal-fired electricity generation in accordance with 1.5°C pathways. (NZAOA 2020)
5. Scale blended finance to facilitate global finance flows to emerging markets and development economies (EDMEs), which are particularly vulnerable to climate change. (NZAOA 2021)

Urgent action is needed from all—financial institutions, business, cities, individuals, and government—in order to maintain the swiftest possible trajectory to net zero emissions by 2050, and to keep temperatures to their lowest possible outcome. The Alliance stands ready to engage with all actors to secure our most pressing global imperative.

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Annex: Additional data and figures




Figure A.1: Breakdown of the Alliance's membership by institution type



Figure A.2: Breakdown of the Alliance's total AuM by institution type




Figure A.3: Ambition of sub-portfolio targets set for corporate debt

Table A. 1: Overview of members' intermediate targets

#	Member	Country	Type	Data provided to NZAOA Secretariat	Link
1	Eskom	South Africa	Pension/super/retire/provident	2024	Link
2	FSRG represented by FGIS	Gabon	Sovereign Wealth Fund or government control fund	Overdue	Overdue
3	African Risk Capacity Insurance Company Limited	South Africa	Insurance company	2023	Link
4	Jessie Smith Noyes Foundation	USA	Endowment/Philanthropy/Family Offices	Overdue	Overdue
5	Compagnie européenne de garanties et cautions	France	Insurance company	Due 11/24	Due 11/24
6	COFACE	France	Insurance company	Due 12/24	Due 12/24
7	Fidelidade - Companhia de Segouros, S.A	Portugal	Insurance company	Due 2025	Due 2025
8	Crédit Agricole Assurances	France	Insurance company	2024	Link
9	Groupama	France	Insurance company	2024	Link
10	Just Group Plc	United Kingdom	Pension/super/retire/provident	2024	Link
11	MAPFRE, SA	Spain	Insurance company	2024	Link
12	Pension Caixa	Spain	Pension/super/retire/provident	2024	Link
13	R+V Versicherungen	Germany	Insurance company	2024	Link
14	Aegon Ltd.	Netherlands/ Bermuda	Insurance company	2023	Link
15	Aema Groupe	France	Insurance company	2023	Link
16	Allianz SE	Germany	Insurance company	2023	Link
17	Assurances du Groupe BPCE	France	Insurance company	2023	Link
18	AXA Group	France	Insurance company	2023	Link
19	BNP Paribas Cardif	France	Insurance company	2023	Link

#	Member	Country	Type	Data provided to NZAOA Secretariat	Link
20	BT Pension Scheme	United Kingdom	Pension/super/retire/provident	2023	Link
21	Gothaer Group	Germany	Insurance company	2023	Link
22	Group Versicherungskammer	Germany	Insurance company	2023	Link
23	HUK-COBURG Versicherungsgruppe	Germany	Insurance company	2023	Link
24	Industriens Pension	Denmark	Pension/super/retire/provident	2023	Link
25	Legal & General	United Kingdom	Insurance company	2023	Link
26	Old Mutual	South Africa	Insurance company	2023	Link
27	P+	Denmark	Pension/super/retire/provident	2023	Link
28	Pension Insurance Corporation	United Kingdom	Insurance company	2023	Link
29	PensionDanmark	Denmark	Pension/super/retire/provident	2023	Link
30	Provinzial Holding AG	Germany	Insurance company	2023	Link
31	Sammelstiftung Vita	Switzerland	Pension/super/retire/provident	2023	Link
32	Sparkassen-Versicherung Sachsen	Germany	Insurance company	2023	Link
33	Stichting pensioenfonds IBM Nederland	Netherlands	Pension/super/retire/provident	2023	Link
34	Stichting Pensioenfonds Medisch Specialisten	Netherlands	Pension/super/retire/provident	2023	Link
35	The Russell Family Foundation	USA	Endowment/Philantrophy/Family Offices	2023	Link
36	Unipol Gruppo S.p.A - UnipolSai Assicurazioni	Italy	Insurance company	2023	Link
37	United Nations Joint Staff Pension Fund	USA	Pension/super/retire/provident	2023	Link
38	VidaCaixa	Spain	Insurance company	2023	Link
39	Ageas	Belgium	Insurance company	2022	Link

#	Member	Country	Type	Data provided to NZAOA Secretariat	Link
40	AkademikerPension	Denmark	Pension/super/retire/provident	2022	Link
41	Bayerische Versorgungskammer	Germany	Insurance company	2022	Link
42	CDC - Caisse des dépôts et consignations	France	Sovereign Wealth Fund/Government Control Fund	2022	Link
43	ERAFP—Etablissement de Retraite Additionnelle de la Fonction Publique Pension Scheme	France	Pension/super/retire/provident	2022	Link
44	Intesa Sanpaolo Vita S.p.A.	Italy	Insurance company	2022	Link
45	KENFO	Germany	Sovereign Wealth Fund/Government Control Fund	2022	Link
46	LVM Landwirtschaftlicher Versicherungsverein Münster a.G.	Germany	Insurance company	2022	Link
47	M&G (Prudential Assurance Company)	United Kingdom	Insurance company	2022	Link
48	MAIF	France	Insurance company	2022	Link
49	Meiji Yasuda Life Insurance Company	Japan	Insurance company	2022	
50	Munich Re	Germany	Insurance company	2022	Link
51	Nippon Life Insurance Company	Japan	Insurance company	2022	Link
52	Novartis Pension Fund	Switzerland	Pension/super/retire/provident	2022	Link
53	Pensioenfonds Detailhandel	Netherlands	Pension/super/retire/provident	2022	Link
54	QBE Insurance Group Limited	Australia	Insurance company	2022	Link
55	Rothsay	United Kingdom	Insurance company	2022	Link
56	SCOR SE	France	Insurance company	2022	Link
57	SOMPO Holdings	Japan	Insurance company	2022	Link
58	Sumitomo Life Insurance Company	Japan	Insurance company	2022	Link

#	Member	Country	Type	Data provided to NZAOA Secretariat	Link
59	SV SparkassenVersicherung	Germany	Insurance company	2022	Link
60	UNIQA Insurance Group AG	Austria	Insurance company	2022	Link
61	University Pension Plan	Canada	Pension/super/retire/provident	2022	Link
62	AMF	Sweden	Pension/super/retire/provident	2021	Link
63	Aviva Plc	United Kingdom	Insurance company	2021	Link
64	California Public Employees' Retirement System CalPERS	USA	Pension/super/retire/provident	2021	Link
65	Church Commissioners for England	United Kingdom	Endowment/Philanthropy/Family Offices	2021	Link
66	CNP Assurances	France	Insurance company	2021	Link
67	Danica Pension	Denmark	Pension/super/retire/provident	2021	Link
68	David Rockefeller Fund	USA	Endowment/Philanthropy/Family Offices	2021	Link
69	Folksam	Sweden	Insurance company	2021	Link
70	Generali Group	Italy	Insurance company	2021	Link
71	Lægernes Pensionskasse	Denmark	Pension/super/retire/provident	2021	Link
72	Nordea Life & Pensions	Sweden	Insurance company	2021	Link
73	PFA Pension	Denmark	Pension/super/retire/provident	2021	Link
74	Phoenix Group	United Kingdom	Insurance company	2021	Link
75	Prudential plc	Hong Kong	Insurance company	2021	Link
76	Société Générale Assurances	France	Insurance company	2021	Link
77	St. James's Place Group	United Kingdom	Insurance company	2021	Link
78	Swiss Re Ltd	Switzerland	Insurance company	2021	Link

#	Member	Country	Type	Data provided to NZAOA Secretariat	Link
79	The Co-operators Group	Canada	Insurance company	2021	Link
80	The Dai-ichi Life Insurance Company, Limited	Japan	Insurance company	2021	Link
81	Unilever Pension Funds (Uninvest Company)	Netherlands	Pension/super/retire/provident	2021	Link
82	University of Toronto Asset Management Corporation (re University of Toronto Endowment)	Canada	Pension/super/retire/provident	2021	Link
83	Wespath Benefits and Investments	USA	Pension/super/retire/provident	2021	Link
84	Zurich Insurance Group	Switzerland	Insurance company	2021	Link
85	Alecta Pensionsforsakring	Sweden	Pension/super/retire/provident	2020	Link
86	Caisse de dépôt et placement du Québec (CDPQ)	Canada	Pension/super/retire/provident	2020	Link
87	Fonds de réserve pour les retraites - FRR	France	Sovereign Wealth Fund/Government Control Fund	2020	Link
88	Storebrand ASA	Norway	Insurance company	2020	Link




Figure A.4: Ambition of sub-portfolio targets set for directly-held real estate



Figure A.5: Ambition of sub-portfolio targets set for bonds, equities, real estate, and infrastructure

Table A.2: Engagement targets achieved in full (in absolute and percentage terms)

Target year	Number of engagement targets set	Number of engagement targets already fully achieved	Percentage
2025	242	134	55%
2030	41	14	34%



UN-convened Net-Zero Asset Owner Alliance

unepfi.org/net-zero-alliance/